Re: Teo Van Gogh!
Po nese ke ndonje nate te gjate kohe, lexoje......
Eshte kilometrike, po te hap syte dhe te ben te mos cuditesh me shume gjera qe kane ndodhur e po ndodhin!
Continuity of Anglo-Saxon geopolitical planning in Europe
By: Natalia Narochnitskaya
Repartition of the world routinely occurring at the break of each new century, this time is anything but reflection of the ideological struggle of the 20th century. Demagogic speculations on rivalry between “Totalitarianism” and “Democracy” are alas too reminiscent of the Marxist social science thesis: “The essence of our era is in transition from Capitalism to Communism”. In fact, the notorious “struggle” of ideologies had little effect on the actual international relations in the 20th century, including the Cold War. As far as the present-day “democratic” projects of restructuring Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are concerned, we see the same geopolitical and spiritual aspirations of the Old World’s imperial past.
By joining NATO Hungary and Czech Republic fled not from Communism, but from Russia which is alien to them, and returned to the Latin sphere. No need to wonder that Catholic Poland has so much sympathy for Chechen bandits who cut off heads of Christians to celebrate the 2000th anniversary of Christ’s birth. We could remember that Adam Mickiewicz “faded away” somewhere in Constantinople where he tried to build up a “Polish Cossack Legion” to fight the Crimean War on the side of “civilized” Ottoman Turkey against “barbaric” Russia. The emerging arch between the Baltic and the Black seas is a projects to deny Russia access to the seas dating back as far as the 16th century, by which the Balkans and Vardar Morava valley with Kosovo Field again, like 100, 200, 400 years ago, become an axis between the Western Europe and the Black-sea straits.
Finally, Pope John Paul II sows distemper and discord within the nation by visiting Ukraine, obviously, following the line of Pope Urban VI, who called out in 1596, right after the Union of Brest: “Oh, my Russians! I hope to reach the Orient through you”. The ancient dream of both the Vatican and Rzecz Pospolita is to capture Kiev, the “mother of the Russian cities” and the symbol of succession from Byzantium, first spiritually, and then physically. However, in 1990s “theories” of racial difference between “Aryan Ukrainians” and “Turanian Muscovites”, who allegedly misappropriated both the garments of Sophia and the history of Kiev, were popularized in the Western Ukraine. But there was nothing new in such anthropology - it is exactly what Franziczek Duchinsky, a provincial Pole, preached in Paris in the 19th century, stirring up the “Latin” West’s perpetual interest in devouring post-Byzantine lands, which could only be possible after Ukraine was separated from Russia.
Generally accepted sceptical attitude towards the classical geopolitics, which is mostly concerned with Pan-Germanic strategies and plans, also overshadows the self-evident historical fact: all the objectives that Germans failed to achieve in WWI and WW2 were incorporated in the consistent Anglo-Saxon strategy and accomplished rather successfully by the end of the 20th century. The geography and the timing of NATO expansion perfectly fits the 1911 Pan-Germanic map and the ideas of Friedrich Nauman. And what could not be achieved by politics and ideology, was finished by entirely “Teutonic” methods - a war against Yugoslavia.
MODERN GEOPOLITICAL CONSTANTS. FIRST WORLD WAR.
Looking at the course of the 20th century we may suddenly come to a conclusion, that the whole century was a systematic expression of the same geopolitical vision. It’s all about the “Eastern Problem”, the Straits, Constantinople, and a spiritual and geopolitical dilemma of “Russia vs. Europe”. They reflect centuries-old aversion of Russia as a geopolitical power equal to the combined West and an independent historical entity with its own quest for the universal purpose of existence.
What would free access to the Aegean sea mean for Russia? It would mean access to Salonika, and from there by land - to Vardar Morava valley, the only natural valley in the Balkans connecting Western Europe to the southern seas. It would provide Russia with unsurpassed geopolitical power in the Post-Byzantine territories and accelerate the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in a form not controlled by the West. Greece might join the Russian sphere of political influence; uniform Orthodox Christian Slavic states oriented towards Russia might emerge. In the aggregate it would provide spiritual and geopolitical consolidation to create a prominent international political centre in the Eurasian continent with invulnerable boundaries and access to the Baltic and the Mediterranean seas and to the Pacific ocean. Latin Europe would become a Eurasian “makeweight” sliding towards Atlantis.
Neither Great Britain, nor Austria, which has always been seeking to set its feet at the seacoast by capturing Bosnia, would allow that. And so would the rest of Europe, since the rival faction of Christianity might become geopolitically invincible, leaving no chance for the Germans to expand their “Lebensraum” and for the Anglo-Saxons to play on collision between the Germans and the Slavs in that “Lebensraum”. In this case France would also become a natural ally to Russia, since the Germans would turn against them.
Should natural delimitation of interests between the Germans and the Slavs occur one day, this hypothetic outcome would be particularly unacceptable for England. But Germans have always preferred to expand their “Lebensraum” to the Slavic lands instead of expensive contest for the neighbouring territories in the West, even though they occasionally fought the French there with various degrees of success. Therefore Europe jointly held back Russia and the liberation movements of Greeks and Slavs conquered by Turkey, forgetting about their own rivalry for a while. Russia too was sometimes reluctant to support the Slavs’ struggle for liberation, even though Russia sympathized this struggle, since it wouldn’t want to see them falling into “Pax Germana” right after liberation from “Pax Ottomana” being unable to withstand an inevitable coalition of European powers should Russia try to oppose it. This is the notorious “Pan-Slavism”. All these seemingly regional problems comprised the world’s “Eastern Problem”, in which no Western historiography is sincere.
Why was it important for Russia not to conquer, but only to ensure free passage through the Straits? The circumstances were such that Russia, despite the clichй, did not strive for sole control for the Straits, since Russia never had enough strength to conquer and retain Constantinople, or it would require such effort that would render it senseless. (The treaty signed in 1915 is a completely different case - there should have been some compensation to Russia for the terrible losses at the Eastern Front, but it was not the purpose of the war).
The most sensible conditions would be the ones that prevented entry of foreign warships in case of danger or attack against Russia while allowing Russian ships to pass through the Straits.
Such status could only be reached once, in Inkyar-Iskelesi Treaty with the Ottoman Turkey in 1833 which marked the culmination of the Russian diplomatic success in the Middle East in the 19th century. This Treaty, concluded entirely through negotiations and not aimed at foreign territories, a treaty between two sovereign states controlling the whole coast line of the Black sea, caused “resentment” in the West. France and England refused to reckon the treaty in their diplomatic note to Turkey and started creating a coalition, trying to involve Austria into it, which later resulted in the Crimean War.
N. Danilevsky wrote, that for Britain, the trade and transportation routes of which did not depend on the Straits, “all the benefit from owning Constantinople was limited to the harm it would bring to Russia”. (N. Danilevsky. Russia and Europe. St. Petersburg, 1995, pp. 311, 317.)
The major powers directly influencing the Balkans were Austria-Hungary and Russia. The increasing strength of Germany and its aspirations in the Middle East, tendency towards break-up of the Dual Monarchy became evident already in the first decade of the 20th century, as well as disintegration of Ottoman Turkey. Addition of any new country to the traditional spheres of influence would dramatically change the balance of power in the Straits region and considerably strengthen the positions of the continental states. The British projects and speculations on incorporating the Balkan Slavs into the international relations evidently show that the plans systematically promoted under different names throughout the 20th century ended up in signing the Souht-Eastern Europe Stability Pact.
In the end of the 19th century in England there was much speculation about the “future” of Central and Sout-Eastern Europe. In 1888 a map showing European states “after the world war” (!) was published (R.Heise. Die Entente-Freimaurerei. Basel, 1920.). Another map, which was published by H. Laboucher, MP and editor of “Truth” weekly magazine in London, in 1890, 24 years before WWI (Des Kaisers Traum. The Kaiser's Dream. Faksimile-Dokumentation 1992), is even more impressive, as it shows roughly the European borders established in 1990s. Both the maps showed the Hapsburg monarchy and Germany reduced by half, approximately to their current size, and were divided into small secular republics, Bohemia becoming Czechia, Silesia becoming Poland (!), and the southern lands forming the “Danube Union”. Russian Empire was to be transformed into “Slavic Confederation” or simply reduced to “Desert”. All the Western Europe’s coastline was shaded as “independent regions politically influenced by the United Kingdom”. Now they are all part of NATO or support NATO, with the exception of Montenegrin Boka Kotorska and Albanian coast, which lies behind the Kosovo field!
Now that we know the events that followed in the 20th century and brought these ideas to life, we may wonder whether the authors of this “cartographic ruin” of the political and geographical appearance of the world before the two world wars of the 20th century practiced political grotesque, or it was some sort of a programme. We may recall the name of sir Halford Mackinder, whose work on the “geographical pivot of history” was also published 10 years before WWI. His next work (Mackinder H. Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, N.Y., 1919.), issued right as the Anglo-Saxons prepared the Treaty of Versailles, is a complete illustration and realization of the maps mentioned above, since in this book Mackinder is bluntly stating that fragmented Eastern Europe is needed as a buffer between the Germans and the Russians to establish control over Eurasia.
British geopolitical thinking is uniform: both the traditional studies of this subject and the exotic ones follow the same paradigm. The goal of Britain was to prevent the newly created countries from joining the German or the Russian spheres of influence by preventing consolidation of uniform Slavic nations. For Croatians and Slovenians at that time would inevitably be drawn into the German sphere, while Serbian and Bulgarian states, however resourceful their elite might be in manoeuvring between the Great Powers, could not be withdrawn completely from the Russian sphere of influence.
Any display of Serbian aspirations for national unification after Ilia Garasanin’s “Nacertanije” (the Project) published in 1844 has been a bugbear for the Western Europe. Such course of events was ruled out both by Robert Seton-Watson, the patriarch of British Balkan studies, and in 1913 Carnegie Fund report on the Balkan wars. Besides the visible scepticism in respect of the Serbian ideas, which were named a “fancy of exalted dilettante historians”, the report pays special attention to the Macedonian issue, which is imposed by the wish for complicating the relations between the potentially leading subjects of policy in the Balkans - Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece.
Seton-Watson, being an expert in the “Eastern Problem”, interprets this problem in the paradigm that has remained unchanged till the present day: the fate of Serbo-Croatian race will determine the balance of power in the Adriatic region, with all that it implies with regards to consequences for the international situation.
Seton-Watson rejects the very idea of Serbian unification, the triumph of which, according to him, would become a disaster for the European culture and a severe blow on the progress and modern development in the Balkans in general. Before the war this Briton also writes, that the mission of representing the Western culture in the Balkans lies with Austria-Hungary, which, according to Seton-Watson, should have been created if it had not existed (Seton-Watson R.W. The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy. London, 1911, p. vii,337.). After the war Seton-Watson's and other British configurations were aimed to create unstable dependent formations of five-six nations drawn to partners in opposition to each other, where the historical and political potential of these nations would be neutralized, making them building stones for a Mackinderian layer between Germany and Russia from the Baltic to the Mediterranean sea controlled by Anglo-Saxons.
At the same time a prominent Russian expert in political geography, V. P. Semyonov-TyanShansky presented a report “On Potent Possession of Territories as Applied to Russia” where he pointed out some of the territorial control and influence systems that existed in the world: “ring-shaped” around a sea - Ancient Greece, Rome, Arabian conquest of Europe, and an attempt to recreate such system by Napoleon; “patched” - the British colonial empire resting on the naval power and the slavery of native inhabitants of the colonies; “sea-to-sea” - the USA (even creating an “island” of a sort) and the Russian Empire from the Baltic and the Black seas to the Pacific ocean with the West moving in from the one side and China looming on the other. He also noted, that the “sea-to-sea” system along the meridian between the Baltic and the Mediterranean sea, which might seem most feasible, has never been created.
Such a system would only be possible for Russia, if it controlled Constantinople completely, which should not be attempted, he warned, and the existing system should be preserved (V. P. Semyonov-TyanShansky. “On Potent Possession of Territories as Applied to Russia”. St. Petersburg, 1911).
Minister P. N. Durnovo, dubbed “reactionary” by Liberals and Marxists, showed remarkable political far-sightedness in his memorandum to the Emperor in 1914. He predicted that any sacrifice offered by Russia, be it bearing the main burden of war or ramming the massive German defence will be in vain, since “Russia will be unable to ensure any permanent strategic gains” worth these sacrifices. Why? Because it fights on the same side as Great Britain, its geopolitical rival (P. Durnovo’s Memorandum, Paris, 1943).
Indeed, in the beginning of WWI, according to G. Mikhailovsky, one of the outstanding Russian diplomats, whose memoirs were discovered and published only in 1990s, the Russian Foreign Ministry made use of all the classified files from the Minister’s office and the Middle East department for the past 10 years. “The study revealed the picture of Russian policy in this critical location”, including “Izvolsky’s and Charykov’s ideas of Constantinople as a neutral and free city, belonging to no country, but with Russian cannons at the Bosporus, in exchange for consent for Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and the schemes of a “separate treaty with Turkey” similar to the one signed in Inkyar-Iskelesi in 1833. (G. N. Mikhailovsky. Notes on the History of Russian Foreign Ministry, 1914-1920. In two volumes. Volume 1. August, 1914 - October, 1917. Moscow, 1993, p. 85.). But it was evident that Great Britain’s distinctly negative attitude towards any form of Russian control over Constantinople rendered any of these schemes useless, which was also noted by Mikhailovsky: it was Great Britain that “foiled the Russian plans by opposing… both in 1908 and in 1912-1913”. Sir Edward Grey provided no support to Izvolsky in his attempted “games of chess” around the Bosnian crisis.
But we can hardly agree to the opinion of Henry Kissinger, who wrote in his “Diplomacy”, that Britain had virtually no interest in the Balkan affairs. The purpose of Britain’s participation in the Entente was to prevent both Germany and Russia from winning the war and to rearrange South-Eastern Europe. We might say, that the British, and the Anglo-Saxon strategy in general, before and during WWI was quite successful.
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
If we take a look at the geopolitical strategy skilfully put in place by the very course of preparation of Paris Peace Conference, it becomes evident that its purpose is to implement the plan proposed by sir Halford Mackinder, though the latter was displeased with vague rhetoric of Versailles. The whole Mackinder’s geopolitical strategy serves the primeval purpose of the British policy - prevent any continental country from becoming too powerful. Therefore, it is aimed at the same time against Russia, against Germany, and against their partnership. And it requires separation of Russia and Germany by an interlayer of independent East European countries to prevent the Russians or the Germans from taking over.
Remarkably, Mackinder attributes the term “Eastern Europe” to all the territory East of Berlin meridian, viewing Eastern Germany and Austria as Slavic lands conquered by Teutonic forces. However, this concern for Slavs was not sincere. Mackinder believes that both Central Europe (Germany) and Eurasia (meaning Russia) gain global significance only coupled with Eastern Europe.
Small countries caught in between two rival geopolitical systems can be anything but independent. They are controlled, if not Germans or Russians (the purpose of Mackinder’s plan is to avoid it), then by Anglo-Saxons. But this control, given the distance between Eastern Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries, can only be exercised through taking over the European coastline and through establishing blocs and alliances, through supranational institutions that, depending on the political and ideological situation, may take different forms: military and political alliances, international organizations or so-called “collective security” systems.
In order to create minor states in Eastern Europe, the two multinational powers (Austria and Russia) were to be dismembered. The Versailles system, which included mandatory control over the south-eastern flank - the Danube region and access to the Mediterranean sea, accomplished the first part of this programme. Even creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians served the intention to erase the traces of Austrian and German presence in the Balkans, with Anglo-Saxons providently using pro-German Croatians and nationalistic Macedonians to restrain the potential of Serbs.
The new Anglo-Saxon geopolitical theory needed an ideological foundation, and “Wilsonianism” provided a suitable ideology - “Democracy and Self-Determination”. Since the League of Nations would later restrict the right for self-determination solely to the “countries engulfed in war and revolution”, and for the rest one the right for self-determination would “conflict the very idea of a state”, it means that wars and revolutions are needed to establish geopolitical configurations as described above. These are the two states that give effect to the democratic reorganization and self-determination doctrine with a tabula rasa attitude not only towards the defeated countries, but towards all other parties to the war and all the borders in the war-impacted area.
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
In historiography Hitler and Stalin are often presented as similar phenomena, and the war is viewed as a battle of two totalitarian regimes, while the Anglo-Saxon partners in the Anti-Hitler Coalition only strive for the triumph of American Democracy, and this struggle had been going on in 1980s-1990s against the remaining “totalitarian regimes” (first in the USSR, then against Milosevic). But a study of archives exposes the same geopolitical ideas under the peel of ideology.
On March 25-26, 1935, during clandestine negotiations between sir John Simon (Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom) and Hitler in the Chancellor’s palace in Berlin, the records of which were acquired by the Soviet intelligence and first published in 1997, Hitler in every way denies the possibility of cooperation with the Bolshevik regime. Sir John Simon, in his turn, says that “the Communist threat is more of an internal issue, than an international one”. The purport of his message to Hitler was in approval of the Anschluss of Austria - His Majesty’s Government… would not treat Austria in the same way as, for example, Belgium, a country immediately neighbouring the United Kingdom. (“Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence”. In 6 volumes. Vol. 3, 1933-1944. Attachment. Moscow, 1997. Pp. 463-464, 467).
Meanwhile the US behaved in the same way they did in 1913-1917, which may be confirmed from the transcript of Roosevelt’s report on talks with Mr. Ransiman, a special envoy from Baldwin’s Cabinet, held on September 29, 1937. The main purpose of these talks was to ensire neutrality of the US in the future war. Roosevelt intended to remain neutral for as long as possible. However, by conquering Russia Germany would become the world’s Power #1, which would be totally unacceptable for the US. He said that should an armed conflict between the Democracies and Fascism erupt, the US would do their duty. Should the war be started by either Germany or the USSR, the US would remain neutral. But should the USSR be threatened by German territorial demands, the European countries would have to intervene, and the US would join them. (ibid., p. 468). Thus, the US would intervene only when a single continental power would prevail in Eurasia.
The German ambitions for conquering their “Lebensraum” in the east seemed to undermine the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical doctrine of a “layer of minor dependent states between Germans and Russians from the Baltic to the Mediterranean”. However, the UK and the US indirectly encouraged Hitler to move to the East. The common opinion is that the UK wanted to appease Hitler by the Anschluss of Austria and by the Munich deal. Quite the contrary - Germany’s satisfaction with the Munich treaty and the Anschluss, accepted by the “international democratic community”, would be the worst outcome for Anglo-Saxons. It might become a revision of the Versailles system, that would be difficult to oppose in the future - these lands were not conquered during 1914 - 1918, but belonged to Germany and Austria-Hungary before World War I.
This would mean unification of the German potential - Britain’s nightmare since the times of the Triple Alliance. Shortsightedness of the Nazi Germany can only be explained by the narcotic action of National-Socialist ideology. The Anglo-Saxons’ reliance on uncontrolled ambitions was true. Aggression in the East would justify intervention and, under certain circumstances, allow for completion of the geopolitical projects based on the principles of “self-determination and democracy”, which will be established not only in the countries under attack, but in the whole region. However, the Anglo-Saxon strategy failed. Invasion in the USSR was delayed until the surrender of Western Europe according to the Soviet-German Pact of 1939.
E. Nolte in his book that opened the so-called “dispute over history” took the war between “National Socialism and Bolshevism” as the “European Civil War”, and called this treaty a “Pact of War”, “Pact of Partition”, “Pact of Destruction” (of Poland), which had been supposedly unprecedented in the 19th and the 20th centuries, therefore “both the states signing this Pact must have been the states of a special kind” (Nolte Ernst. Der Europaische Burgerkrieg. 1917 - 1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschevismus. Propilaen. 1987. S. 310-311.). Such a peremptory statement would bring an ironic grin to the face of any historian specializing in international relations.
Stalin’s willingness to turn a blind eye on Hitler’s aspirations in Poland (which, besides, had recently offered Hitler its services in the conquest of Ukraine) in exchange for delaying the war against his own country and capitalizing on a chance to reclaim the territory of the Russian Empire lost due to the Revolution, are identical to the pragmatism or, if you will, cynicism of sir John Simon’s words that the United Kingdom cannot treat Austria in the same way as Belgium, or to the Western powers’ refusal to guarantee the borders of Poland and the Baltic States by a collective security pact thus opening the way towards the USSR.
Secondly, from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Dayton Treaty, the essence of any bilateral treaty, saying nothing of the multilateral treaties from both the “Imperial” past and the “Democratic” present, would be in drawing up the borders for other countries, and the secrets of the diplomatic history are dedicate to nothing but “rearrangement” of borders.
In Tilsit Napoleon tried in vain to persuade Alexander I to destroy Prussia; the Congress of Vienna approved a multinational quasi-state of Switzerland to avoid geopolitical strengthening of certain states. We could also recall Lenin’s words in relation to the Congress of Berlin: “Turkey is being robbed.” In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia with diplomatic support from other powers. Though it was Theodore Roosevelt who started the ideologization of the US interests with the ideals common to all the mankind, it was by the secret treaty of 1905 between T. Roosevelt and Katsura that Japan abandoned its “aggressive stance” towards the Philippines leaving them for the US, and the US agreed on the right of Japan to seize control over Korea by military occupation.
In Versailles, after the diplomatic debate, the winning Anglo-Saxon part of the Entente, including the super-democratic US with Wilsonian “self-determination and democracy”, splintered Austria-Hungary and draw the borderlines for the states emerging from its remains, defining first, who will have their own state, and who will not (like Macedonians), who will change one master for another (like Halicia), and who, like the Serbs, the Croatians, and the Slovenians, will have to co-exist willy-nilly. Potsdam and the following committee of the foreign ministers decided the borders of many countries and the fate of former colonies. In 1993 G. Kennan in his preface to the new edition of Carnegie Fund report on the Balkan wars directly calls for creating a new status quo for the Balkans and to use force to compel all the interested parties to observance of this status quo, which came to the existence in Dayton.
During the “European Civil War” (© Nolte), in 1944, a top secret analytical study was prepared by the Department of the State of the democratic United States. This study formulated an extrapolation on the Monroe Doctrine for the entire world, which made any other concept of a broader security zone come into conflict with the omnipresent United States. The Monroe Doctrine was viewed as a type of geopolitical strategy covering large territories in the sphere of its prevalent and decisive political influence. This study candidly admitted the fact that the Monroe Doctrine and the German doctrine of “Grossraum” are of the same nature. Even the strategy of binding the whole Europe from Gibraltar to the Urals and from Norway to North Africa under the German control and rule, this idea of Hitler’s, is modestly called “the Nazi Monroe Doctrine” and coolly studied as a geopolitical concept in conflict with the US interests, even though it has specific ideological justifications and methods of achievement” (Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Stock 0512, Inventory 4, Document 212, File 25, pp. 4-7.).
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 became the greatest failure of the British strategy in the 20th century, therefore it will be demonized forever. It is unlikely that the UK planned to stay out of the war, but it, as well as the whole of the Western Europe, would be in the most advantageous position should Hitler first attack the USSR, the Ukraine through the Baltic States, which were denied security guarantees by the British opening the way for Hitler in the same way as Stalin kept open the way through Poland. Hitler’s first attacking the USSR and becoming bogged down in the war of attrition would promise preservation of the “Atlantic” Europe with relatively small losses, feebleness or disintegration of the USSR, and possibility of rearrangement of the Eastern Europe.
However, even the British politicians found Stalin’s actions well-grounded and naturally following both the historical rights and the current situation. Commenting on the Soviet-German pact on October 4th, 1939 in the House of Lords, Lord Halifax noted, that two things should be reckoned with: firstly, the Soviet government would never take such actions without an example of Germany invading Poland without a formal declaration of war, and secondly, the Soviet actions in fact moved the border to the line recommended by Lord Curzon during the Versailles Conference. (Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Stock 7, Inventory 4, 19, File 27, p. 25.).
Indeed, all the lands but a piece of Bukovine taken by Stalin were the territories “snapped off” from Russia during the Civil War (a similar term was used by Henry Kissinger with respect to the spheres of influence defined by Soviet-German Pact, when he forgot for a moment, that a few pages later he was going to demonize the “Nazi-Soviet Pact”). Nevertheless, the chapter dedicated to this Pact shows a mix of disappointment and unintended admiration. Thus, he quotes Hitler saying on August 11, 1939: “Everything I do is aimed at Russia. If the West is too dumb and blind to comprehend it, I’ll have to make a deal with Russia and defeat the West first, and then, after they are defeated, turn all the accumulated resources against the Soviet Union.”
Kissinger agrees that it was a clear reflection of Hitler’s priorities: he wanted non-interference in the Continental Europe from the UK and he desired “Lebensraum”, i.e. “room for living”, from the Soviet Union; the measure of Stalin’s success is that he, even though for a short period of time, shifted Hitler’s priorities. But this was the possible maximum, and cannot be viewed as anything but a huge diplomatic success. By the way, this is exactly how Kissinger treats this pact. (Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. Moscow, 1996. Pp. 298, 302.).
Part 2
REALPOLITIK AND IDEOLOGY BEHING THE MILITARY COOPERATION AND DURING THE COLD WAR
On August 14, 1941, merely six weeks after Hitler attacked the USSR, F. D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill signed the “Atlantic Charter”, a declaration that is usually viewed as a list of democratic principles and general formulas of the aim of this war - it is stressed that both the US and the UK “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other”.
The Atlantic Charter appealed to the right of all the nations for self-determination and proclaimed “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”. The peoples never asked anyone for such permission and, therefore, the purport of such declaration is to claim the right of the Anglo-Saxons to judge whether the existing sovereign states deprive their peoples of their rights and to selectively deny recognition of sovereignty.
The US and the UK also declared their intention to contribute to restoration of “sovereign rights and self government” to “those who have been forcibly deprived of them”, making no reference to Hitler’s aggression. The “nations” included not only the states, but also the peoples had had no states of their own. Should this paragraph be formulated as a return to the pre-war status, it would only mean cancellation of the effects of aggressions and annexations by Germany, the Axis and their satellites.
But there was no such definition.
It was a declaration of the right to recognize or not recognize not only the results of aggression, but also the pre-war reality since the war began. In fact, it was an euphemistic declaration of the world map a tabula rasa and of the right to “draw the fates of the peoples living there” (according to Col. House’s interpretation of the Russian section of President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”). Roosevelt first of all meant the Baltic States, South Slavs, and all the peoples of Russia, except for Russians - “the victims of the imperialist policy of the Communist Russia” - that will appear in the US Congress “Captive Nations Resolution” (P.L.86-90, 1959).
Important evidence comes from the activities of the mysterious US Committee on Foreign Relations. Before August 1942 the CFR did an extremely intense job of systematizing and studying the possibilities of rearrangement of post-war Europe, working mostly on its central and eastern part. It included the “Group on Review of Peaceful Intentions of the European Nations.”
The meetings of this Group included participation and even reports by A. Smetona (ex-President of Lithuania), K. R. Pusta (ex-Foreign Minister of Estonia), A. Bilmanis (ex-Latvian “Ambassador Plenipotentiary” to the USA, Austrian Archduke Otto von Hapsburg, A. A. Hranovsky (President of the “Organization for Revival of the Ukraine”), representatives from Macedonian political organizations, Polish emigration elite, former officials of Czechoslovakia and Romania, O. Jaszi (ex-Hungarian Minister of Nationalities), and many others. The Group was chaired by H. F. Armstrong himself. Members of this Group were A. Dulles and W. Mallory (Executive Secretary).
The fact that “nations” represented in this Group did not match fully the European states that officially existed in Europe before Hitler’s aggression give another reason to interpret the Atlantic Charter not as a demand of rejection of Hitler’s aggression and return to the pre-war status, but as an instrument of rearranging even the pre-war European borders using the aggression as a pretext.
The US relied exactly on the same “buffer” Eastern and Central European forces in 1990s’ NATO expansion to the East after the geopolitical significance of Russia / USSR diminished.
This may also be confirmed by the official letter to the US President signed by Macedonian emissaries (K. Popov, H. Anastasov, K. Rolev, L. Dimitrov, etc.), in which they express their gratitude to 1913 Carnegie Fund Report and hope that “application of the second and the third points of Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration (the Atlantic Charter) dated August 14, 1941 to solve the Balkans issue will allow Macedonians to win the long-cherished geographical and political unity, independence and government” (Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia. Stock 0512, Inventory 4, 221, File 25, pp. 16, 13.).
The fact that the authors bound the fate of Macedonians as a “divided” nation “oppressed by the regimes of three countries: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece” to the Atlantic Charter, and not to Hitler’s aggression, confirms that the Charter was intended not to respond to Germany’s conquest, but to declare the whole Europe a political tabula rasa.
A week after the Atlantic Charter, on August 22, the CFR dedicated a meeting to the US strategy in the new circumstances. The cynical pragmatism of this meeting would have embarrassed even Talleyrand and Machiavelli.
“If the Bolshevik regime holds out:
...
b) Should the US seek after balance between (post-war) Germany and Russia by creating buffer states independent from each of them...”
“If the Bolshevik regime falls:
a) Should the US endeavour to reinstall Bolshevism in Russia.
b) Should the US, following Hitler’s example, authorize mass resettlement of the people to create a buffer zone between Germany and Russia.
If cooperation with Germany is established after the Bolshevik regime:
a) Should the US prevent this regime from controlling the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
...”
However, conclusions are the most valuable part in this document:
“The military outcome of this war will decide not only the fate of the Bolshevik regime. It may call forth a huge rearrangement of power from Bohemia to the Himalaya and the Persian Gulf. The pages of history are reopened, and paint is again streaming on the maps.
The key to this lies in reorganizing the Eastern Europe, creating a buffer zone between Teutons and Slavs. It is in the interests of the US to endeavour to solve this problem in a constructive manner...” (Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia. Stock 0512. Inventory 4. No. 213. File 25, page 3.).
SECOND WORLD WAR
The goal of Britain in this war was to prevent the USSR from gaining support in the Southern Europe. Britain evaded Stalin’s insistent requests to open the Second Front in the areas where it would help to defeat Germany persistently suggesting the Second Front in the Balkans. In the end, they landed in Greece to control the Straits and to exclude strengthening of the pro-Soviet forces there, which was quite possible.
Already in 1942 in his letter to Joseph Stalin, where he first mentions the future safety arrangements, W. Churchill outlined the structural elements of the future Europe, stating that they will involve the “great nations of Europe and Asia Minor” (thus reasserting his primeval stake on Turkey), and mentioned the “Danube configuration” (Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia. Stock 0512, Inventory 4, Document 304, File 31, p. 1.).
The British strategy was to prevent the Straits, South-Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Orthodox Slavs from falling into the geopolitical sphere of Russia. This complete reproduction of the Eastern problem became perfectly clear to Stalin in Tehran. At the end of the “Big Three” summit, according to M. Gilbert, Churchill spoke of post-war future and his feeling that “Prussia … must be isolated and reduced in size, and Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary might form a broad, peaceful … confederation” (Gilbert Martin. Winston S. Churchill. Volume VII. The Road to Victory. 1941- 1945. Boston. 1986, p. 575.).
Churchill suggested that Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Pfalz, Saxony, and Baden should be cut off to form a part of the “Danube Confederation”. Stalin understood Churchill’s intentions and asked whether Hungary and Romania would become members of a similar combination. (Churchill Winston. The Second World War. Vol. V. Closing the Ring. Moscow, pp. 392, 393, 394). R. Riemeck, a German historian, noticing this dialogue, supposed that Stalin opposed to the plan of “involving the Southern Europe, first of all the Balkan Slavs, into the Western power sphere” not because he wanted to convert the Southern Europe to Communism, but as any Russian statesman and any Russian tzar would have to do to resist the aspirations of the West in this regard. (Riemeck Renate. Bilanz eines Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart, 1997. S.177.).
The secret theoretical study by the US Department of the State dated February 16, 1944 states that the Soviet Union would naturally object to the “sanitary cordon” along its borders. It would resist any attempts to create confederations involving whole or part of the Central and Eastern European states, including the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-Yugoslavian pacts proposed in 1942 (Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia. Stock 0512, Inventory 4, Document 212, File 25, pp. 27-28.).
Britain’s choice between the rival anti-Fascist parties - the partisans of J. B. Tito and Draze Mihajlovic, who were both allies to the anti-Hitler Coalition, is quite logical. Unlike in Greece, where the British landing prevented the left from coming to power, here Britain thought that Communist Tito would be a better candidate and insisted on Mihajlovic’s resignation. Tito knew how to awake Churchill’s interest, and Тin his letter to the Prime Minister he stressed his intention to create a unity of Yugoslavian peoples that had not existed before the war - a federative Yugoslavia.
Such a plan would bind diverse Balkan peoples (Croatians, Serbs, and Albanians) preventing them from becoming either pro-Germanic or pro-Russian, being at the same time in correspondence with the “Danube configuration” with regards to size, access to the seas and intention to create an independent centre of power. Churchill immediately offered Tito the support of His Majesty’s Government (Churchill Winston. The Second World War. Vol. V. Closing the Ring. Moscow, pp. 459, 460). Tito capitalized on the British interests, but Tito’s Yugoslavia existed only for as long as Anglo-Saxons needed it.
British secret researches known to the Soviet intelligence include Eden’s Memorandum in 1944 and Cooper’s reply aimed at preventing domination of the USSR in Europe. One of the means was to create a Western-European bloc and a powerful anti-soviet Poland that will become the only factor separating Russia and Germany. These speculations by Cooper are quite in line with Mackinder’s ideas.
Transcript of a conversation between J. Stalin and W. Churchill on October 14, 1944 made during Churchill’s and Eden’s visit to Moscow, shows the real price of the Polish issue for Britain: Churchill worked persistently with the Poles for the whole morning, but did not achieve much. However, in Churchill’s opinion the Poles were not far from accepting his proposals. But at the same time Churchill warned that should this information leak to the press, the Poles might raise a clamour that would bog rat harm during the US presidential elections. Therefore Churchill suggested that the negotiations were kept in secret for three weeks, until the US elections are over.
The British plans in South-Eastern Europe were of strategic importance, and Churchill yielded Poland with no remorse to hold his positions in an issue of much greater importance for Britain and the US - regulations on the Black Sea and the Straits. Stalin insisted that the eastern border is drawn along the Curzon Line. Churchill suggested that the Poles’ objections preceding their agreement were recorded. “This will not do,”- said Stalin calmly, and the conversation ended up by Churchill’s assurance that the British government fully approves of Marshal Stalin’s wish to ensure the existence of Poland friendly towards the Soviet Union. (Transcript of conversation between J. Stalin and W. Churchill. October 14, 1944. Bulletin of the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation. Source - Documents on Russian History. 1995/4 (17). P. 145).
Considering the persistent strategy of Anglo-Saxon forces in Eurasia, we can imagine the blow delivered to these plans by the newly emerged might of the USSR. Instead of a layer of weak countries independent both from Germany and from Russia from the Baltic to the Black sea, instead of a “buffer between the Teutons and the Slavs” the victory of the USSR and the decisions made in Yalta and Potsdam undermined these strategy and resulted in submission of the whole Eastern Europe to the influence of Russia/the USSR.
COUNTER-YALTA
When cannons on the WWII battlefields were silenced, negotiations between Russian Foreign Minister Molotov, US Secretary of the State Byrnes, UK Foreign Minister Bevin in September and October 1945 turned into diplomatic trench warfare.
The obvious stand of the Anglo-Saxon forces, as it becomes clear from the declassified transcripts of these negotiations, was as follows:
The USSR must not be let into the Balkans so that the southern border of the Soviet geopolitical safety zone did not reach the Mediterranean, i.e. so that it could not become a “sea-to-sea” meridional system as proposed by Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, but was rolled back to the Black sea, separated from the Southern Europe both in political and military terms, and the West could be in control of the Mediterranean and the Straits.
An impressive amount of transcript pages is dedicated to thorough and fierce arguments over the issues of presence and access to the Mediterranean, namely - the forms of trusteeship and the fate of the former Italian colonies, shipping on the Danube river, and the geographical area and the status of Trieste, a tiny point on the maps of Europe.
The events of 1990s, direction of NATO expansion, occupation of Kosovo - the key to Vardar Morava Valley connecting the Western Europe to the Straits - seem to be a deferred implementation of plans that failed in the end of the World War and at the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings.
These projects show the strategic similarities and geopolitical patterns that became so familiar since the 19th century (first of all, the Eastern Problem), but this time they are camouflaged by the fight between “Totalitarianism and Democracy”.
Contrary to the existing clichй, Russia’s allies again, like in World War I, did not let Russia expand its sphere of influence beyond the boundaries where it already was a dominating power by early 20th century. The vacuum in the South - in the area of the Straits, at the meeting-point of civilizations - created by disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the century and by the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, was to be filled with forces out of Soviet control or rival to the USSR, until they become elements of new configurations (e.g. NATO).
The UK and the US refused to recognize the governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, as allegedly created in a non-democratic manner, while Poland and Czechoslovakia were given up quite easily, though there was even less reason for that - unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia, the rest of the countries were “guilty” of being “German satellites”, and the USSR, being an “occupying” winner in this war, had even more moral and political rights to secure “friendly” governments there. The reason of it lies in the “International waterways” - navigation on the Danube, the demand to fully internationalize the Danube.
At the official meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945 and 1946 filled with diplomatic innuendos, Molotov suggested that the former colonies of the “defeated powers” were mandated to the Allies. He specifically Tripolitania as a potential mandated territory for the USSR. J. Byrnes and E. Bevin objected to that with no apparent reason. The private conversation between V. Molotov and E. Bevin on September 23, 1945, declassified in mid-1990s, exposed everything.
Bevin was against the prospect of Russian presence in the Mediterranean by way of a mandated territory in Tripolitania: “Churchill once mentioned, that Generalissimo Stalin told him, that the Soviet Union has no intention to move into the Mediterranean”. Bevin also requested plainly, that the British government should regain everything in lost during the war when the international waterway regime is established.
Molotov’s response was equally blunt: “During the previous World War the British Government promised Constantinople to the Tzar’s government. The Soviet government lays no claim to that.
Why is the United Kingdom so interested in the Black sea straits? The Black sea is an internal sea, and this war showed that it is not safe for the Soviet Union... The British government, however, doesn’t want the Soviet union to come to agreement with Turkey on this issue... You want to have us by the throat in the Straits by the Turkish hands. And when we raised the question of getting a single mandated territory - Tripolitania - in the Mediterranean, you regard it as an encroachment on the rights of the UK... Why can’t the Soviet Union have a patch of land in the Mediterranean for its merchant fleet?”
What was Bevin’s response? “As for Tripolitania, he, Bevin, can only say… that the British Government is afraid that something could happen in the Mediterranean, that would divide the British Empire into two parts.”
“The British Government is striving for restoration of its rights on the international waterways in Europe.” A prerequisite for that would be full internationalization of the Danube. Right here Bevin hints that “Britain might change its negative attitude towards recognition of the Romanian and the Bulgarian governments and ascertain, whether the policy of the British Government with regards to these countries could have been wrong” (Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia. Stock 0512, Inventory 4, Document 304, File 31, pp. 33- 60.).
Again we see the 200-year-old reality - “the Eastern Problem”.
After Churchill’s Fulton Speech was delivered, it shocked the world, but for Stalin, who was familiar with the rigid position of his former allies, it turned out to be merely a final propagandistic and ideological plop. We should note that when Churchill was preparing this speech, he showed it to J. Byrnes who was “very enthusiastic about it and proposed no changes”. And the President told Churchill, that at that moment an American Task Force consisting of the “world’s most powerful battleship Missouri, two newest aircraft carriersб a few cruisers, and a dozen of destroyers” was preparing for deployment in the Sea of Marmara. So much effort to convoy the body of the Turkish ambassador who died in Washington!
The events surrounding “the Eastern Problem” became a background for this speech. Those were the days when the world learned about the USSR’s intention to withdraw only part of the troops from Northern Iran and Molotov’s direct address to the Turkish Foreign Minister A. L. Erkin, raising the question of returning Kars and Ardagan to Russia and joint Soviet and Turkish control of the Straits. (Ibid. See also Erkin Feridun Cemal. Les Relationes Turco-Sovietiques et la Question des Detroits. Ankara. 1968, pp. 323-327.). It should be noted, that already in Tehran, responding to Stalin’s probing on Britain’s attitude to a Soviet base at the Dardanelles, Churchill in his turn promised that the Convention on Black Sea Straits signed in 1936 in Montreaux will be revised in favour of the USSR. In 1945 Britain was preserving the “Eastern Problem” as fiercely, as it did before WWI. We can only assume, that the fate of Britain’s promise with regards to Constantinople given in 1915 would have been the same.
The USSR’s advance into the European heartland all the way to Berlin was not viewed as a particular threat by the Anglo-Saxons, but an attempt to restore the provisions of 1833 treaty of Inkyar-Iskelesi had not become more tolerable than it was 150 years before! I can’t help remembering the wisdom of P. Durnovo who warned the Tzar of the danger of fighting alongside the traditional geopolitical adversary. (Durnovo’s Memorandum, Paris, 1943.) In fact, contrary to the common thinking, control over the Eastern Europe did not add much to the power of the USSR and became a heavy burden for it, with the need for constant supervision of the less than loyal “brothers”, like Poles and Hungarians, who desired nothing more than revenge on Russia.
The only real prize of this war might be restoration of the historical Russian territories that once made Russia a power to reckon with in Europe, and these were lost after the Congress of Berlin - Kars, Ardagan (occupied by Turkey in 1918), the Baltic states, and free passage through the Straits. These territories, unlike satellite Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, had belonged to Russia before the Revolution, and not even the toughest enemies of Russia dared to contest it! But, after surrendering the Eastern Europe, the USSR’s Anglo-Saxon allies stood hard as a rock opposing restoration of Russia’s historical territory, since, like in WWI, the main reason for their participation in the war against Hitler was to ensure that neither Germany nor Russia wins.
RUSSIA, “MITTELEUROPA” AND THE BALKANS IN THE ANGLO-SAXON “GEOPOLITICAL AXIS” OF THE MODERN HISTORY
At the break of 1990s Russia surrendered its geopolitical position and renounced its traditional geopolitical constants. What’s happening to Europe? The Western Europe remains much the same as decided in Yalta, and what is more - it is consolidated by NATO. But the “Socialist Eastern Europe” crumbles into the post-Versailles “Mitteleuropa” that had to be promptly incorporated into the Western post-Yalta framework controlled by Anglo-Saxons. But at the southern flank, in the Balkans, the same area that caused so much argument at the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Yugoslavia was visibly turning from a counterweight to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact into an anti-Atlantic force, and the released Serbian potential posed a threat of “wrong orientation”, that, as Russia would inevitably re-emerge, could render all the Anglo-Saxon scheming in the Balkans since early 20th century (creation of the “Danube configuration” in the Anglo-Saxon sphere) senseless.
The euphemism of “Kosovo Conflict” was needed to destroy and paralyze Yugoslavia - the last bearer of the post-war balance of power. The war in Bosnia and the “Kosovo crisis” blended with the plans of expanding NATO to the East. The Yugoslavian anti-Atlantic enclave with the access to the Mediterranean sea became the missing tile in the mosaic where all the Western Europe’s coasts are under the “political control” of Britain. In this “second Versailles” the expansion of NATO was merely one of the aspects guaranteeing stability and invariability of the role played by the Western structure that remained within the framework of Yalta agreements, unlike the Soviet system, and was positioned along Mackinder’s meridian in Berlin.
In 1996 the U.S. National Defense University republished H. Mackinder’s book with a foreword by US Air Force Lt. Gen. Ervin Rokke, President of this University. Rokke discovers that “already in 1942 Allied strategic planners recognized the value of Mackinder's work, which they used in engineering the defeat of Germany”, and later he admits that “the entire anti-Soviet Cold War (1947-1991) was merely an interlude” in the “the greater struggle for supremacy over the World Island by the maritime powers”. According to Rokke, “regional strategic concerns” force the NATO powers “to once again rely” on the “classic” idea of geopolitical war for world domination proposed by Mackinder.
The US and NATO strategy in Yugoslavia and the ideological motivations were similar to the strategy in the 19th and early 20th century. The works of Sethon-Watson and Mackinder remain actual, and so does the work of Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky who mentioned the most tempting “sea-to-sea” sphere of influence along the meridian from the Baltic to the Mediterranean sea, which Germas tried to create twice, in 1914 and 1941, but now it seems this task may be accomplished by Anglo-Saxons who, unlike Hitler, succeeded in equating their great-power aspirations with the universal system of ethics.
Vardar Morava valley becomes the key to “strengthen the US foothold in Eurasia through Transatlantic partnership” so that the “expanding Europe” could become a “real springboard for advancement into Eurasia”. This is how the geopolitical strategy of the US is viewed by Z. Bzezinsky, whose maps remind of Mackinder’s “geopolitical axis of history” and the constructions of F. Nauman and other ideologists of the German “Grossraum”.
Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, Bodo Hombach, put it straightforwardly that as compared to the previous period, while “before 2000 we still followed the strategy of isolating Serbia…now we can actually speak of reintegration of Yugoslavia into the International community”, and the objectives of the Pact were defined by him as “a chance and a duty not only to adapt to the EU standards, but jointly learn the lessons of post-war Europe” (Internationale Politik. 2000. N 11.) However, the lesson is: the new repartition of the world yielded no fruit to the European powers. Instead, it destroyed the true chance of rebirth for Germany and politically significant Central Europe, that could become a bridge between the West and the East for the first time in the history.
Today the process of turning Easter Europe into Central Europe, and the western territories of the historical state of Russia - into the Eastern Europe is merely a link in the geopolitical chain formulated by the Council on Foreign Relations: “from Bohemia” - which is now a member of NATO - “to the Persian Gulf” - where a regional sovereign state of Iraq was destroyed - and “to the Himalayas” almost encroached by Taliban. This chain is intended to squeeze Russia in a circle from the Baltic sea to the south, then cutting it off from the Black and the Caspian seas, then turning to the East and vanishing in the depth of Central Asia, where the fight for orientation of the newly emerged states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is going on. Both its structural sections and its missing links are already clearly visible, which shows apparent interconnection of all the diverse tools that constructed this arc - from the pro-Atlantic lobby in the Baltic states, anti-Russian fronts in Belarus and Ukraine, to NATO’s invasion in the Balkans, creation of Islamic quasi-formations in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo), linked by this arc to Chechnya and Taliban, whose ambitions stretch as far as the Pamir.
Now that the Russian foreign policy is slowly freeing itself from the virtual dogma of infantile Sakharov-Gorbachov school, I would like to draw attention to the great 200-year efforts of pre-revolutionary Russia in the South. Without being formulated into any kind of a doctrine, it nevertheless possessed the intuitive structural integrity and managed to survive in the most complicated context of interests and civilizations surrounding it. This policy never concealed the national interests, yet it never equated itself presumptuously to the “universal” values, and had principles. It had always been able to commensurate its abilities with the obstacles, to “concentrate” when needed, and to refrain from risky actions.
A nuk ju duket se eshte nje tjeter shprehje e intolerances dhe rrezikut islamist qe keta arabe shimpanze orangotango paraqesin per boten e evoluar perendimore? A nuk mund te thuhet se para se t’i pranonin keta arabe ne vendin e tyre,holandezet duhet t’i detyronin te pranonin zakonet,kulturen,traditat,mentalitetin perendimor?
asurine dhe zgjuarsine!!!Per te debuar arabet nga Evropa mjafton nje ndryshim i nje neni ne ligjet Evropiane,ndersa per Cifutet u desht ndryshimi i nje sistemi te tere,bashke me sjelljen e nje mentaliteti te ri.Ndersa gabimin e kane te perbashket:e njejta enderr,te "pushtojne" Evropen,Arabet me Islamin ndersa Cifutet me ekonomine!!Nderkohe qe Cifutet ia arriten qellimit,Arabet do mbesin me gisht ne....goje le te themi /pf/images/graemlins/laugh.gif .